2017-11-01
218The Paris Peace Accords, signed on October 23, 1991, brought to a close four years of negotiations aimed at ending Cambodia’s civil war. Several factors contributed to the settlement. The war had reached a stale-
196 mate among the major combatants—the National United Front for an Independent Единый национальный фронт Камбоджи (ФУНСИНПЕК) действует с1992г.) Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative сотрудничающую Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), the royalist party of Prince Norodom Sihanouk Сианука; the KR; the State of Cambodia (SOC =партия государства Камбоджи=Народная партия Камбоджи); and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) Кхмерский национально-освободительный фронт(КНОФ)=правая националистическая партия). The external patrons внешние покровители of the warring parties (China, Russia, Vietnam, and the United States) had tired усталость of the stalemate and wished to divest дистанцироваться themselves of their clients. Внешними покровителями КК были Тайланд и Китай, у НПК – Вьетнам и Россия, у ФУНСИПЕК и КНОФ – США.
The countries of the region coalesced объединение, союз, коалиция around a framework that called for multiparty elections, demobilization and disarmament of the parties, and UN implementation контроль of the agreement. The warring parties consented заключили to the agreement as a result of their sponsors’ coercion and remained deeply suspicious of one another as well as distrustful of the international consortium консорциум (временное объединение организаций) —the Core Group, consisting of the permanent five member countries of the UN Security Council and interested regional states, including Japan and Australia— that brokered поддержали the agreement.
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The party to the settlement that commanded the most scrutiny привлекать особое внимание was the KR. Responsible for the deaths of nearly 2 million Cambodians during its three years in power, the KR survived because of its military prowess, support from China, and diplomatic recognition from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States. Inclusion of the KR in the peace process evolved from the recognition by the United States and others that the KR could not be defeated militarily and the hope that peace would marginalize it.23
Between November 1991 and May 1992 the KR complied sporadically спорадически, нерегулярно следовать with the Paris settlement. Immediately after the accords were signed but before deployment of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC= ЮНТАК), a KR spokesman, Khieu Samphan Кхиеу Самфан, attempted to open a political office in Phnom Penh, only to be attacked by SOC-instigated rioters. Samphan retreated уходить, удаляться to Bangkok, and the KR demanded 1,000 peacekeepers to provide security in Phnom Penh. At about the same time, Sihanouk proposed a SOC-FUNCINPEC coalition government as a means of isolating the KR, which was a violation of the spirit and law of the Paris Peace Accords. As a result of these two incidents, a lobby was created that argued the KR was ready to implement the accords but was frightened напугана into noncompliance by its antagonists. Some experts suggested there were two Khmer Rouges: a “moderate” KR that wanted peace and a “hardline” KR that wanted war. Other analysts argued that KR commitment to the accords was always tactical and the belligerence воинственность of its adversaries противников provided it with a convenient excuse подходящим оправданием for spoiler behavior. Evidence of KR intentions, based on interviews of its top officials and lowly foot soldiers, suggests that the party was committed соглашаться с мирным процессом to the peace process insofar as it promised to return it to power.24 The KR interpreted the Paris Peace Accords as giving UNTAC (ЮНТАК) the right to dismantle демонтировать, роспускать the SOC’s (администрацию Народной республики Кампучии, представленную НПК) administration and expel вывод all ethnic Vietnamese from Cambodia. If UNTAC carried out such a program, the KR would benefit имела бы выгоду from the crisis that would ensue являться результатом кризиса for the SOC (Народной республики Кампучии, представленной НПК).
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The KR’s inconsistent непоследовательное behavior between November 1991 and May 1992 provided evidence for different interpretations about its intentions. The KR frequently violated the cease-fire, restricted UN mobility in its areas, boycotted joint military consultations, and attacked a UN helicopter вертолёт in February 1992, wounding a peacekeeper. When UNTAC began in March 1992,25 the KR “adopted a posture of cautious осторожный cooperation, despite engaging in numerous ceasefire violations.”26 On the positive side, it allowed some UNTAC civilians into its areas. Samphan Кхиеу Самфан actively represented the KR on the Supreme National Council (SNC) Высший национальный совет Камбоджи (ВНС), a transitional body composed of representatives of the warring parties, and cooperated on several humanitarian initiatives with the UN.27 On the negative side, the few military observers allowed into KR territory were so limited in their activities that “at times they seemed more [like] hostages заложники than monitors.”28
The issue of KR noncompliance неподчинение проявилось surfaced publicly in May and June 1992. On May 30, 1992, a group of KR soldiers refused to allow a UN armed convoy, accompanied by the secretary-general’s special representative, Yasushi Akashi руководитель ЮНТАК Юсуси Акаси, and his force commander, General John Sanderson, to enter KR territory in western Cambodia. Instead of insisting on UNTAC’s (ЮНТАК) right of passage право проезда, Akashi retreated. When cantonment расквартирование (войск), demobilization, and disarmament of all of the warring parties began in June, the KR insisted that it would not comply не согласны с демилитаризацией because Vietnamese forces were still present in Cambodia in violation of the Paris Peace Accords and because UNTAC had not established effective control over SOC (Народной республики Кампучии). The KR insisted that it would demobilize only if UNTAC (ЮНТАК) dismantled распустит SOC administrative structures and vested узаконит власть the SNC Высший национальный совет Камбоджи (ВНС) на всей территории with the power to run the country.
UNTAC officials debated the use of force to gain KR compliance. French General Michel Loridon, UNTAC’s deputy force commander представитель командования миротворческими силами ЮНТАК, believed that a show of strength would compel the KR to meet its obligations and would establish a reputation among the other factions that the UN would enforce compliance. If the UN did not act, Loridon maintained, it would lose credibility with all of the parties. He asserted that UNTAC (ЮНТАК) had the legal authority to enforce compliance and did not need to seek a Chapter 7 mandate to do so.29 Human rights organizations and nongovernmental organizations in Cambodia supported Loridon’s call for toughness поддерживали жесткую позицию against the KR.30
Akashi and Sanderson opposed the use or threat of force against the KR for six reasons. First, Sanderson drew no distinction between threatening the KR with force to gain compliance and going to war with the KR.31 This dovetailed данная позиция совпадала with Akashi’s assessment that the troop contributors спонсоры миссии to the mission, as well as the Core Group (СБ ООН), would oppose fighting a
198 war. Second, Sanderson thought that UNTAC was not organized for offensive атакующих operations and would thus prove ineffective. Third, both Akashi and Sanderson argued that any attempt to use force would destroy the Core Group’s consensus (СБ ООН); it was unlikely that the group would immediately agree to condemn осуждать KR behavior and condone поддерживать the use or threat of force. Fourth, they believed that, if the Core Group disintegrated, the operation would collapse. Fifth, they thought that any use of force would undermine the attempt to negotiate compliance, which was Akashi’s preferred approach and which meshed совпадать with Sanderson’s belief in the “good Khmer Rouge-bad Khmer Rouge” line (деление красных кхмеров на умеренных и радикалов); as long as there was a good KR, there was a possibility of earning ожидать добровольного согласия its voluntary compliance. Sixth, Akashi feared that using force against the KR would upset нарушит баланс the balance of the peace process. FUNCINPEC and KPNLF(Кхмерский национально-освободительный фронт(КНОФ)) derived some of their power from the KR counterbalance to the SOC; to weaken the KR might tempt the SOC to seek an outright victory.
Akashi sought to discuss with the KR its noncompliance. He quickly realized осознал that the KR interpreted two key components of the Paris Peace Accords in ways counter to their spirit. First, the KR believed that an injunction предписание о выводе for the removal of all “foreign forces” meant all foreigners, regardless of their status as combatants. At stake риску подвергался was the political status of non-Khmer Cambodians, especially ethnic Vietnamese who lived in Cambodia. Second, the KR insisted that the accords required the complete destruction of SOC administrative structures. Akashi realized осознал that meeting the first demand would violate human rights and pander спровоцирует to ethnic extremism and that meeting the second demand was impossible: UNTAC (ЮНТАК) did not have the administrative personnel or know-how to replace the SOC. The likely result would be chaos, which, although satisfying KR aspirations, would destroy the peace process.32 Akashi chose not to appease не выпонять требования KR demands and began to build a strategy for managing the party’s spoiler behavior. He met with local representatives of KR patrons покровители—Thailand and China—to create a unified approach to the problem, privately condemned KR noncompliance at SNC (Высший национальный совет Камбоджи (ВНС)) meetings, and уведомил then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that pressure would likely have to be applied in the future.
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In diagnosing the problem in a letter to Boutros-Ghali in July 1992, Akashi described the KR rejection of UNTAC’s efforts to address its concerns and stated that KR behavior had demonstrated that it was not sincerely искренне committed to the peace process. He attributed KR noncompliance to its attempt “to gain what it could not get either in the battlefield or in the Paris negotiations, that is, to improve its political and military power to such an extent that the other parties will be placed at a distinct disadvantage when UNTAC leaves прекратит миссию).”33 Akashi then chronicled acts of bad faith злонамеренности
199 by the KR and asserted that Samphan Кхиеу Самфан “is little more не более чем than a glorified mouthpiece глашатай; выразитель (интересов) of…Pol Pot,” who “seems to be dedicated to the doctrine of simultaneously ‘talk and fight.’”34 He argued that the circumstances dictated a strategy of “patient настойчивое persuasion” and “sustained непрерывное pressure.” He insisted that UNTAC “adhere to an impartial stand, while criticizing any acts in violation of the Paris Agreement.” Although doubting KR good faith сомневаясь в честности намерений, Akashi asserted that keeping an open door to its participation would prevent turning KR followers into a “permanent disgruntled раздражённое minority.”35
Akashi pointed out that leverage рычаги воздействия на КК over the KR could come from Thailand and China. He expressed skepticism about the former because of the unwillingness of the Thai government to control several army generals who collaborated with the KR in illegal timber and gem trading торговля древесиной и драгоценными камнями across the Thai border. Akashi also argued that China’s influence over the KR waned уменьшение влияние Китая после подписания мирных соглашений after the signing of the peace accords and its cessation of assistance to the KR. He requested запросил информацию that, if KR noncompliance continued, Boutros-Ghali should mobilize economic pressure against the KR(применить стратегию карантина): “This should not however involve any spectacular производящий глубокое впечатление; впечатляющий; эффектный action, but rather a steady strengthening of our border checkpoints adjacent соседний; сопредельный to the DK [KR] zones, in order to control the inflow ввоз оружия и нефти of arms and petroleum and the outflow вывоз драгоценных камней и лесоматериалов of gems and logs, a major source of DK’s [KR’s] income.”36
By leaving open the door to the KR to rejoin присоединения к мирному процессу the peace process, Akashi hoped to contain сдерживать its dispute with UNTAC and to limit its hostility враждебность to the peace process. An aggressive stance toward the KR would make targets of all UNTAC’s (ЮНТАК) personnel. If KR opposition could be contained сдерживать;, UNTAC (ЮНТАК) could redeploy передислоцировать, переместить its peacekeepers to protect the election выборы, which would go forward without the KR. The Australian foreign ministry promoted поддержал Akashi’s strategy in a September 1992 policy paper that became the basis of the international response to the KR.37 It sought a concerted согласованную позицию response from the Core Group (СБ ООН), based on the judgment that KR “demands are not in strict accord with the actual terms of the Paris Agreements.”38
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Although Sanderson was loathе неохотно to try to enforce KR compliance with the peace process, he reconfigured переместил the peacekeepers to protect the strategic objective of holding проведение выборов the elections. He redeployed his battalions in ways that could contain сдерживать KR attacks and reinterpreted the traditional peacekeeping doctrine of neutrality and impartiality объективности, going so far as to use military units of all of the factions (save ограждать от the KR) to assist UNTAC (ЮНТАК) in providing security during the election. Sanderson justified using soldiers from the other parties by insisting that these armies were not deployed against the KR per se but rather against any force determined to disrupt the election. In a rather ingenious находчивый, искусный formulation, he described the changed military mission as “an interposition вмешательства strategy, but not between opposing
200 forces. Rather, it was between a highly moral act sanctioned under international law and supported by international consensus, and any person or group which might threaten it.”39
To help establish an atmosphere where civilians would feel secure participating in an election, UNTAC (ЮНТАК) created a radio station in December 1992. Although its purpose was to convince voters of ballot secrecy конфиденциальность выборов and to explain UNTAC’s mission and activities, it also aimed to neutralize KR propaganda. The establishment of Radio UNTAC overcame objections преодолело возражения of the UN Secretariat, among others, that an independent media outlet СМИ would endanger UNTAC’s (ЮНТАК) perceived neutrality.
From September 1992 to May 1993, the scheduled month последующие месяцы перед выборами for elections, UNTAC (ЮНТАК) held firm in its strategy. The Core Group (СБ ООН) clearly signaled that the peace process would go forward without KR participation. China and Thailand acceded соглашаться на to a nonbinding UN Security Council resolution to impose economic sanctions on the KR. And as the election date drew near, both China and Thailand explicitly supported the elections. Although the KR increased attacks against UNTAC (ЮНТАК) during March and April 1993, it did not unleash не допустилиa военных преступлений military offensive against the elections, which were held as planned.
UNTAC’s strategy for dealing with the KR was imaginative творческий, оригинальный and effective and serves as the prototype прообраз of the departing-train strategy for managing spoilers. When faced with KR attempts to undermine peace, UNTAC (ЮНТАК) emphasized that the peace process would not exclude the KR nor would it be held hostage заложник by it. UNTAC (ЮНТАК) tried first to address the KR’s specific demands, but when such demands threatened the core agreement of the peace process, UNTAC (ЮНТАК) sought international consensus to delegitimize KR demands and to approve the strategy of continuing the peace process in its absence. UNTAC (ЮНТАК) reconfigured itself militarily to protect the electoral process from KR attack but left open the door to the KR if it wanted to reengage the peace process.
