References

Notes

· Brandt 1959, p. 153: "[Objectivism and subjectivism] have been used more vaguely, confusedly, and in more different senses than the others we are considering. We suggest as a convenient usage, however, that a theory be called subjectivist if and only if, according to it, any ethical assertion implies that somebody does, or somebody of a certain sort under certain conditions would, take some specified attitude toward something."

· · "moral subjectivism is that species of moral relativism that relativizes moral value to the individual subject". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

· Brandt 1959, p. 154: "A subjectivist, clearly, can be either an absolutist or a relativist."

Ideal observer theory is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

1. Ethical sentences express propositions.
2. Some such propositions are true.
3. Those propositions are about the attitudes of a hypothetical ideal observer.

In other words, ideal observer theory states that ethical judgments should be interpreted as statements about the judgments that a neutral and fully informed observer would make; " x is good" means "an ideal observer would approve of x ".

“

The main idea [of the ideal observer theory] is that ethical terms should be defined after the pattern of the following example: " x is better than y " means "If anyone were, in respect of x and y, fully informed and vividly imaginative, impartial, in a calm frame of mind and otherwise normal, he would prefer x to y. [1]

”

This makes ideal observer theory a subjectivist^[2] yet universalist form of cognitivism. Ideal observer theory stands in opposition to other forms of ethical subjectivism (e.g. divine command theory, moral relativism, and individualist ethical subjectivism), as well as to moral realism (which claims that moral propositions refer to objective facts, independent of anyone's attitudes or opinions), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true in any sense), and non-cognitivism (which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all).

While Adam Smith and David Hume are recognized to have espoused early versions of the ideal observer theory, Roderick Firth is responsible for starting a more sophisticated modern version.^[3] According to Firth, an ideal observer has the following specific characteristics: omniscience with respect to nonmoral facts, omnipercipience, disinterestedness, dispassionateness, consistency, and normalcy in all other respects. Notice that, by defining an Ideal Observer as omniscient with respect to nonmoral facts, Firth avoids circular logic that would arise from defining an ideal observer as omniscient in both nonmoral and moral facts. A complete knowledge of morality is not born of itself but is an emergent property of Firth's minimal requirements. There are also sensible restrictions to the trait of omniscience with respect to nonmoral facts. For instance, a geological event in another solar system is hardly something necessary to know to make a moral judgment about a case of theft or murder on Earth.

Those proposing the ideal observer theory do not assert that any real ideal observers actually exist.

References

· Brandt, Richard (1959). "Ethical Naturalism". Ethical Theory. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. p. 173. LCCN 59010075.

· · Brandt 1959, p. 153: "[Objectivism and subjectivism] have been used more vaguely, confusedly, and in more different senses than the others we are considering. We suggest as a convenient usage, however, that a theory be called subjectivist if and only if, according to it, any ethical assertion implies that somebody does, or somebody of a certain sort under certain conditions would, take some specified attitude toward something."

· Firth's main work on this is set out in the article 'Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer', from P

http://philosophy.berkeley.edu/file/835/WallaceSubjectivism-Final.pdf

Moral Subjectivism by R. Jay Wallace

University of California, Berkeley

Moral thought is commonly supposed to be a matter of subjective attitude, in a way that contrasts with thought about (say) mathematics or the natural world.

If you judge that 12 x 3= 36, or that the cat is sleeping on the bed, nobody is likely to conclude that that is just your opinion.

Your thoughts seem to be about a subject matter that is prior to and

independent of them, and in that respect objective.

We might say that judgments of these kinds are answerable to independent facts of the matter, insofar as their correctness or incorrectness depends on how things are independently of the judgment’s being made.

With moral thought, by contrast, things are often taken to be

otherwise.

Consider the judgment that it is wrong to make insincere promises

or to exploit the weak and vulnerable.

It is widely believed that judgments of this kind are not answerable to a

prior and independent subject matter, but are merely a matter of subjective opinion.

This thought is the animating idea behind moral subjectivism.

To a first approximation, subjectivism is the position that moral judgments

such as the judgment that lying promises are wrong — are not about a set of facts that are prior to and independent of them.

Instead, the subjectivist maintains, they reflect the attitudes of the person who

makes those judgments[1].

Two aspects of moral thought particularly encourage this subjectivist

interpretation of it[2]. 2

One concerns its subject matter. Moral judgments typically involve

evaluative or normative concepts, as applied to persons and their actions.

In moral thought we conclude that doing X would be permissible or required, right or wrong, and we judge that people are admirable or blameworthy in virtue of their character traits and the things they have done[3].

Concepts such as permissibility, rightness, wrongness, or blameworthiness,

however, do not seem to correspond to any objects or properties in the natural world.