Historical Security Council

Minsk International Model United Nations 2014

Instructional Guide

Historical Security Council

Dear Delegates!

We’re happy to welcome you as the participants of Minsk International Model UN! This conference will be the most special one for us, as we will try to hold sessions in the Historical Security Council for the very first time. And we can only succeed through our hard work, enthusiasm and strong collaboration. And we as your Chair-persons will give our best to moderate your debates in the most efficient though neutral way.

Firstly, we would like to introduce ourselves.

My name is Alina. I’m a 4-year student of the Belarusian State University majoring in international relations. It’s my eleventh MUN conference all told, but I’m still a bit nervous every time, because MUNs can never be the same. I will certainly make maximal use of my experience and knowledge in order to turn this conference into the most remarkable in your life.

My name is Nikita. I’m a first-year student of the Belarusian State Economical University majoring in Finance and Banking. It’s my 6th MUN conference, but every time there is something special, something new at problems, lifestyle and in you, my friends. This conference will be the best you have ever been at. You will enjoy it, I promise.

The main Agenda of the upcoming conference is “Post2015 Millennium Development Goals: сhallenges to Global Community”. Although the year 2015 has little to do with agendas being discussed in our Council, today in the world of never-ending tensions and impending threats, it’s evermore crucial to remember the lessons of history when the world was about to collapse.

This year at the Historical Security Council we are going to discuss two of the major Cold War conflicts: Korean War and Caribbean Missile Crisis. We need to emphasize that the main idea of the Historical Security Council is not to replay well-know history, but to act as if you lived right there not knowing what is coming next. You are in power to create your own alternative history, to direct the flow of events the way you seem right and to avoid mistakes that could have been done in reality.

One more thing we need to specify is the amount of participants of HSC. As you know there are 15 participants in the ordinary Security Council (5 permanent and 10 non-permanent). Although until the year 1965 there were 11 members (5 permanent and 6 non-permanent). Furthermore, as every 3 of 6 non-permanent members were re-elected annually, you will be challenged to represent two different UN members when discussing conflicts of different years.

We are looking forward to starting our conference and getting acquainted. And we hope that you will exert every effort during preparation and debating so that to find the ways out of the most severe crises of the 20th century. And we in our turn promise to make the event for you as enjoyable as possible.

Perspire and inspire!

Alina Lyakhovskaya & Nikita Smirnov

Feel free to contact us!
Alina: alyachowska@gmail.com; vk.com/galactoza; facebook.com/galactoza.lav

Nikita: jackytv3@gmail.com; vk.com/jackyheyyo;

Crossing 38th Parallel as the Outbreak of Hostilities in Korea (1950)

Only 5 years passed since the United Nations Organization came into being full of post World War II optimism and trying not to repeat the mistakes which had sent the League of Nations to the bottom, when the Korean War started. Not only it was a dramatic, devastating and irreparable page in the history of Korean nation, moreover it was used as an excuse to avoid a “hot war” between the USSR and the USA.

Starting from the 16th century Korean peninsula used to be the main target of Japanese imperialism, which eventually turned Korean into the Japan’s protectorate and preserved this status till the end of the Second World War.

Kim Il Sung
As agreed during the Tehran and Yalta Conferences the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in August 1945 and—by agreement with the United States at the Moscow Conference—occupied Korea north of the 38th parallel. Meanwhile U.S. forces subsequently occupied the south. Both sides pursued the aim to create a provisional government. When the Powers abandoned the peninsula in 1948 and 1949, their ideologies were still alive due to pro-Communist government in the North and the popularity of the image of Americans as liberators in the pro-western South. Both the northern government under the rule of Kim Il Sung and the southern government under Syngman Rhee claimed authority over the whole peninsula.

Syngman Rhee
Before the year 1949 the number of communist guerrilla remained subsequent in the South, and although their quantity was reduced from 5 thousand to one, Kim Il-sung believed that the guerrillas had weakened the South Korean military enough to start invasion and he tried to persuade Stalin that the right time had come. At first Stalin did not consider the time right for the war. But by spring 1950 the strategic situation had changed. The Soviets had detonated their first nuclear bomb in September 1949; American soldiers had fully withdrawn from Korea; the Americans had not intervened to stop the communist victory in China, and Stalin calculated that the Americans would be even less willing to fight in Korea – which had seemingly much less strategic significance.

It’s essential to point out that North Korea military was not only fully armed by the USSR, but furthermore gained the valuable experience during their participation in the Chinese Civil War. Though the South had been armed by America, it stayed inferior to the North in military mastery.

The Chinese leader Mao Zedong made a commitment to send reinforcements if needed, although China was afraid of the possibility of American intervention. Stalin made it clear that Soviet forces would not directly engage in combat, to avoid a direct war with the Americans.

So, why did Americans decided to intervene eventually? Firstly, Truman believed in the so-called domino theory, that once one country fell to communism, others will follow like domino pieces. And USA couldn’t have risked Japan. Secondly, according to the Truman doctrine communism was a threat to American values and it was necessary to stop its enlargement by all means.

Why were South Korean and U.S. forces unprepared? There were a lot of frequent skirmishes along the 38th parallel shortly before the war. So the eventual southward movement of North Korean forces was noticed by the CIA, although it was considered a “defensive measure”. Futhermore, Syngman Rhee had so often talked about invading North Korea that US leaders feared giving him too much in the way of weapons. For this reason, South Korea was sent only rifles, bazookas, and light artillery; tanks and airplanes were held back. Also by 1949, most of the US military had moved out. In January of 1950, the House defeated the Korean Aid Bill by a single vote; Korea was scheduled no to get American Aid for the following year, 1950

In the predawn hours of Sunday, June 25, 1950, the North Korean forces, spearheaded by tanks and self-propelled guns, unleashed all-out attacks across the 38th parallel. The North Koreans had a combined arms force including tanks supported by heavy artillery. The South Koreans did not have any tanks, anti-tank weapons, nor heavy artillery, that could stop such an attack. On 27 June, Rhee evacuated from Seoul with some of the government. On 28 June, at 2am, the South Korean Army blew up the highway bridge across the Han River in an attempt to stop the North Korean army. The bridge was detonated while 4,000 refugees were crossing the bridge, and hundreds were killed. Destroying the bridge also trapped many South Korean military units North of the Han River. In spite of such desperate measures, Seoul fell that same day. A number of South Korean National Assemblymen remained in Seoul when it fell, and forty eight subsequently pledged allegiance to the North. On 28 June, Rhee ordered the Bodo League massacre. In five days the South Korean forces, which had 95,000 men on 25 June, was down to less than 22,000 men. In early July, when U.S. forces arrived, what was left of the South Korean forces were placed under U.S. operational command of the United Nations Command (Korea).

The Security Council met on June 25th 1950 on the very same day that the war broke out, but the Soviet delegation boycotted it. Thus, the obvious use of the Soviet veto right did not occur. The resolution S/RES/82 was signed and called North Korea to immediately withdraw its troops as a diplomatic solution, but it was obviously ignored. So
the UN was forced to intervene to fight alongside South Korean troops under the command of the American general Douglas MacArthur. The UN entry into the conflict led to an internationalization of the conflict that started initially as the civil war.

The date of our historical session will be 1 Aiugust 1950. You shouldn’t take into consideration any events that happened after the announced data. We should also point out that this is the date when the delegation of the Soviet Union ceased its boycott and returned to the Council.

We expect that you will act as mature and responsible ambassadors cowing the seeds of peaceful co-existence and leaving no stones unturned.

FOR FURTHER RESEARCH:

The links for your historical background:

1. http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/korean-war-2 (U.S. Department of State’s historic site)

2. http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/united_nations_korean_war.htm (The role of United Nations in the conflict)

Wikipedia links:

3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War#Outbreak_of_war_.281950.29 (More detailed history)

4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_82 (Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea)

The historical film about the Korean War:

5. https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLF922FF87BD79B393 (The film about Korean War in 3 parts)

6. United Nations Resolutions:

· Security Council: (S/RES/82, S/RES/83, S/RES/84, S/RES/85, S/RES/88 (1950), S/RES/90 (1951)

· General Assembly: (A/RES/293, A/RES/376, A/RES/377, A/RES/410, A/RES 500, A/RES/705, A/RES/711, A/RES/725, A/RES/804, A/RES/910, A/RES/1180)


The Turning Point in the Cold War: Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a thirteen-day confrontation from October 15 to October 28, 1962 between the United States and the Soviet Union over the positioning of nuclear missiles in Cuba. As any conflict it did not start from scratch. Here are several factors that had an impact on escalation of tension in October 1962:

· January 1, 1959 - Cuban Revolution. President Batista of Cuba fled from Cuba to the Dominican Republic. His departure allowed Fidel Castro’s revolutionary forces to seize power; Castro became Prime Minister.

· Towards the end of the 1950s, the United States had begun placing nuclear missiles in Europe. The United States concluded an agreement with NATO member Turkey on October 28 in order to place missiles (intermediate-range ballistic missiles, or IRBMs) in Turkey targeting the Soviet Union. The Jupiter nuclear missiles were officially deployed in Turkey on 1 June 1961.

· Flying over Russia, an American U2 spy plane was shot down by Soviet air defenses. The pilot, Gary Powers, survived and was taken prisoner by the Soviets. The incident forced the United States to admit that it was conducting spy overflights of the USSR.

· The Soviet Union provided diplomatic recognition of the new Cuban government in May 1960. In December Cuba openly aligned itself with Moscow after the Soviet government established trade relations and provided an economic credit to Havana.

· The United States ended all exports to Cuba in response to nationalization of American property in Cuba. Then US closes its embassy in Havana.

· Initiated during the Eisenhower administration, the United States trained and supported a cadre of 1,500 anti-Castro Cuban exiles. On April 17, the rebels landed at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in order to topple the Castro government. The Kennedy administration decided to withdraw military support for the invasion. After three days, the exiles were defeated.

· US and Soviet forces engaged in a stand-off as the Soviets began construction of the Berlin Wall. Ultimately the tanks were withdrawn and President Kennedy accepted the Berlin Wall lest war break out.

· JFK authorized CIA to conduct covert operations in Cuba in order to kill Castro and remove the Communist government from power.

· Organization of American States decided to expel Cuba at its 8th meeting of ministers of foreign affairs.

· In February 1962 the United States announced a near-complete economic embargo of Cuba.

· In May Khrushchev dispatched a delegation to discuss the placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba. Castro accepted the missile deployment the next day.

· On 14 October an American U2 aircraft flying over western Cuba took pictures of the Soviet missile sites capable of carrying nuclear bombs to the U.S.

Once the President John F. Kennedy was informed of a U-2 spy-plane’s discovery of Soviet nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba, Kennedy made a television address informing the world about the Soviet missiles in Cuba. Kennedy announced on October 22 that the United States would enforce a quarantine of Cuba and prevent “offensive military equipment” from reaching Cuba. Kennedy stated that the U.S. would not end the quarantine until the Soviet Union removes their missiles. In a critical moment of international support, the OAS voted to approve the quarantine of Cuba, adding legitimacy to the American blockade. Meanwhile, American ships move into position along the blockade line.

That same day, Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev declaring that the United States would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba, and demanded that the Soviets dismantle the missile bases already under construction or completed, and return all offensive weapons to the U.S.S.R. The letter was the first in a series of direct and indirect communications between the White House and the Kremlin throughout the remainder of the crisis.

On October 24, Khrushchev responded to Kennedy’s message with a statement that the U.S. “blockade” was an “act of aggression” and that Soviet ships bound for Cuba would be ordered to proceed. With the blockade in place, Soviet ships traveling to Cuba held or reversed course. The US subsequently allowed a few ships not carrying nuclear weapons to pass the blockade line.

The day of our imaginable session will be October 25, 1962. Remember, that the world is on the edge of nuclear catastrophe. Think over your every step and let the luck be with you.

FOR FUTHER RESEARCH:

The links for historical background:

1. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/kennedy_cuban_missile_01.shtml (John F Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis)

2. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis (U.S. Department of State’s historic site)

3. http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cuban-missile-crisis (Easy analysis)

4. http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Cuban-Missile-Crisis.aspx ( John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum’s materials)

5. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137679/graham-allison/the-cuban-missile-crisis-at-50 (Retrospective by By Graham Allison)

Video:

1. http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/original-historic-sources/videos/

2. http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/cuban-missile-crisis/videos

Wikipedia link:

3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_missile_crisis (Detailed history of the conflict)

4. http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis_speech_to_the_United_Nations_Security_Council (S Ambassador Adlai Stevenson addresses the UN Security Council and his Soviet counterpart Valerian Zorin on 25 October 1962)

5. http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/colc.html ( Revelations from the Russian Archives )

Selected Key Documents:

1. CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Major Consequences of Certain U.S. Courses of Action on Cuba,” October 20, 1962. (CIA Investigation)

2. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, military briefing, “Notes on October 21, 1962 Meeting with the President.”(Meeting with the American President)

3. “Radio-TV Address of the President to the Nation from the White House,” October 22, 1962. (Kennedy addresses citizens)

4. Prime Minister Fidel Castro’s letter to Premier Khrushchev, October 26, 1962.


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