2015-05-30
580
POST-COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLICIES IN TRANSITION*
„[Westernization is] the only alternative
to the extremely dangerous vacuum of rules,
that obtained after the failure of the [Soviet] Union.“
(Kostrzewa-Zorbas 1992) 1
„We are all rowing in the same direction,
only in different boats and at various speeds”
(Aleksander Kwaśniewski 2001)2
In the years 1989 and 1991 we witnessed a fundamental change in the international order: the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the complete reorientation of the East European states. The recovery of sovereignty (especially for the East Central European countries) after the collapse of the USSR was connected with the task of executing an interest definition in foreign policy affairs, determining position and role in the international system, and creating the institutional and personnel conditions for carrying out the external functions of the state (Bock/ Schünemann 2000).
The consequences of the end of bipolarity were interpreted quite differently. I would like to emphasize two trends: On the one hand, in a triumph of rational logic the ‘End of History’ was proclaimed, linked with the success of democracy and free market economy (Fukuyama 1989)3. On the other hand the realists were predicting a return to international anarchy and therefore to the ‘normal state of familiar conflicts’ as well as purely interest driven politics of sovereign national states (Mearsheimer 1990; von Alten 1994)4. Looking at East Central Europe today, elements of both trends are identifiable. Seemingly the concepts of democracy and market economy, as well as a western oriented foreign policy prevailed after 1989 in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Though certainly not following an endogenic rational logic, but instead giving in to the interest driven liberalization pressure from the West5 (in the understanding of realist concepts) – obeying a new hegemonic agenda.
The comparative analysis of post-communist foreign policies in this region lead to the following, closely interconnected, questions: How wide is the scope of action for post-communist foreign policies after 1989? And which influential factors have more explanatory potential in determining the room for manoeuvre and the specific behaviour in the foreign policy transition: external or internal conditions? Such a research question is linking in the tradition of foreign policy analysis the system- with the state-level of analysis. The contextual circumstances of foreign policy change in Eastern Central Europe after 1989 are thus at the centre of my interest. Essentially the concept of a Hegemonic Change developed by Andrew Janos is applied6. This change serves as substantial background for the necessary reorientation in the external behaviour. Describing the transition from Eastern Empire to Western Hegemony. The point of reference for East Central European States after the dissolution of the Soviet Union were and are the euro-atlantic structures (EU and NATO).
In this understanding the countries of East Central Europe get under the liberalization pressures of the West. This pressure can be conceptualised as Hegemonic Imperative. The term hegemony obscurely went out of fashion in International Relations. But in correspondence with some younger research (Ikenberry/ Kupchan 1990; Wallerstein 1999; Janos 2001; Crawford 2003) this article is another attempt to emphasize the value of the concept of hegemony. Especially the East Central European context presents itself as a very suitable area, since it is this region, where in different times various international regimes were exercising a predominance (Lemberg 1995, 2001; Prizel 1998; Hroch 2000). In the transitional processes after Hegemonic Change these regimes were determining the necessary reorientations and interest formations within the subordinate states (cp. Gramsci 1971). However the hegemonic agendas (according to regime) were confronted with different willingness of adaptation in the East Central European countries.
The end of the Cold War created the Hegemonic Imperative of the euro-atlantic structures, basically a Western orientation of interests, which was actually without any alternative7. Since this Western agenda is exercising a comparable pressure on East Central Europe, we may speak of constants of westernization. The liberalization pressure clashed with local habits and interests that are hard to eradicate since they are deeply rooted in the local socio-economic structure, culture, and historical memories. Since these aspects vary from society to society, hegemonic success in imposing the agenda will also vary (Janos 2001: 223) – the variables of westernization. The East Central European foreign policies are in a transition from Pax Sovietica to Pax Occidentalis.
Hegemony, international regime and Hegemonic Change
The term hegemony defines traditionally a supremacy or predominance of a particular international regime. Power is interpreted in the reading of Max Weber as chance, “to enforce the own will within a social relation even against the reluctance (of others)” (Weber 1921: 28). Rule is the chance, “of finding obedience for an order of specific content within a definable group of persons” (Weber 1921: 28 f.).
Now to the term of international regime: The term international, of course, refers to relations between and among states. In this understanding states remain the decisive actors of international politics. Regime implies a hierarchical relationship of sub- and supraordination endowed with a system of ‘imperative coordination’ (Max Weber’s Herrschaftssystem)8, that is, with the power to set and enforce political agendas, if necessary, by means of force. Such relationships have been described between ‘chiefs and subordinates’ in politics (Max Weber), and, in International Relations, between hegemons and clients. (Ikenberry/ Kupchan 1990; Janos 2001: 222). This is the more subtle component of hegemonic power, one that works at the level of substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs.
Acquiescence is the result of the socialization of leaders in secondary nations. Elites in secondary states buy into and internalise norms that are articulated by the hegemon and therefore pursue policies consistent with the hegemon’s notion of international order (cp. Linden 2002). Basically we find three modes of adapting to the hegemonic imperative: a) normative persuasion (the client states adopt new state policies which are compatible with those of the hegemon and which produce cooperative outcomes – ‘beliefs before acts’); b) external inducement (the hegemon uses economic and military incentives to induce smaller states to change their policies, belief in the normative underpinnings of the system emerges gradually as elites seek to bring their policies and value orientation into line – ‘acts before beliefs’); and c) internal reconstruction (the hegemon directly intervenes in the secondary state and transforms its domestic political institutions, for example a victorious hegemon after war)(Ikenberry/ Kupchan 1990: 290 foll.). Successful socialization occurs during critical historical periods in which Hegemonic Change coincides with domestic crisis in secondary states. The domestic conditions in client states must make the elites receptive to the importation of new ideas and normative claims about state behaviour. Just as state regimes, international regimes vary in purpose, organization, legitimacy and intensity. As mentioned above obedience of the secondary states depends on the mode of socialization of the respective elites. More specifically on the compatibility of the national value system with the Hegemonic Agenda (Ikenberry/ Kupchan 1990).
Context East Central Europe
East Central Europe seems to be the perfect area of research, since this region always has been the victim of foreign conquests or at least getting in dependence to external powers. In the course of its history it was wiped out again and again by two or three power centres (Prussia-Germany, Habsburg-Austria, Russian Empire). The elimination or at least intense reduction of the flanking powers – the end of the three black eagles 1918/199 - left a hegemonic vacuum. This lead to the return of small and weak nation states. The new East Central European ‘Cordon Sanitaire’ was aimed both against the revolutionary bacillus from Soviet Russia and as bulwark against any revisionary aggression of the German Reich10. The connected reflexive relation to the French alliance system suggested a very deceptive security. To describe the entirety of these new states, the dubious but quite correct term ‘In-Between-Europe’ (Zwischeneuropa) was coined. The people of this Zwischeneuropa felt without exception as suppressed and in their cultural identity endangered nations. After 1945 the East Central European states were sovietisized and became part of the Outer Empire of the USSR.
In each of these moments the whole politics of the local small powers was changing in such a way, that they reflected character, interests, and ideology of the new hegemon11. The adaptation was going as far as the respective cultural-historical contexts and economic circumstances allowed. That means, that in a comparative analysis internal conditions of hegemonialization have to be integrated. Since even in the most asymmetrical power relations, the weak will have opportunities to frustrate or corrupt the externally imposed political agenda by simulation (Janos 2001). The domestic and foreign politics of the East Central European states are depending functionally on two main influential factors, which stand in the centre of these reflections:
(1) Requirements and demands of the external Hegemon
(2) Character of internal structures (cultural, historical, economic, institutional)12
This is the similarity of politics in communism and post-communism. The countries of East Central Europe share the existence of an external power, which is establishing and imposing specific political aims, and thus is influencing (if not determining) the orientation and performance of the respective foreign policies (Janos 2001). At the same time there is a long history of conflict between the respective hegemonic programmes and the cultural systems of perception, action and thinking in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. As we could observe different ways to Socialism13 – there will be various paths to the West as well.
The collapse of the Outer Empire 1989-1991
When Michail Gorbačev took power the relations between the Soviet Union and the outside world changed dramatically14. On the 7th of July 1989 Gorbačev announced that he rejects any interferences with the sovereignty of other states. Three months later his press spokesman Gennadij Gerasimov issued, what he called humorous the ‘Frank-Sinatra-Doctrine’: The Soviet satellites (members of the Outer Empire) may go their ‘own way’15, in doing so, the Soviets hoped to keep at least some elements of communist rule (Janos 2000). Thus Gorbačev dissolved the main charter – the glue of the Outer Empire: the Brešnev-Doctrine.
The foreign policy of Russia was caught in a conceptual self-finding process in the first years of independence and was consequently way to much occupied with its own problems, as such incapable of developing a consistent policy towards East Central Europe (Pravda 1992)16. In opposition to the reintegration of East Central European states and the Western orientation of their foreign policies after 1989 was Russia simply unable to present any serious alternative (Skak 1996; Grudziński 1997).
From the Outside in17 – Constants of Westernization
The absence of any alternatives to Westernization was further strengthened by the Hegemonic Agenda of the new international regime. It is hardly exaggerated to claim, that the Visegrád-States were from the beginning structurally dependent in their relation to the EU (Hudalla/ Pradetto 2001). In the following section the exogenic influences on the foreign policy transition is examined. Thus the parameters of foreign policy change are established, derived from a realist argumentation. The term reintegration is preferred over integration, since in my opinion this process is indeed a re-integration into the Western sphere, which is reflected in the post-communist slogan of the ‘Return to Europe’18, and in such a way is describing truly the transition to a new international regime (cp. Skak 1996; Ito/ Tabata 1994). “The East Central European states are in a special situation”, the direction of their foreign policy transition and the linked processes of adaptation “are not chosen by themselves. (…) After decades of Soviet hegemony these newly created nations have almost no time to find their identity, rather the goal of EU-integration is forcing all those arguments on their knees, which could eventually slow down or even stop the train to Europe” (Frantz 2000: 41).
What motivated the future hegemon was politics, in the beginning influenced by a faint desire to live up to Western cold war rhetoric – which decried a continent torn asunder, a common culture ravaged by barbarians, and ‘captive nations’ behind an ‘iron curtain’ – and then by a concern about security. “On the one hand, there was the more distant threat of a new Russian challenge to the continental balance of power; on the other, the more imminent prospect of chaos and disorder in lands adjacent to their own, including visions of the looming peril of waves of impoverished refugees migrating westward” (Janos 2000: 363)19.
In spite of the differences between old and new regime there is some elements of continuity. It should be remembered, that the Hegemonic Change did not stand for a transition to equality, but rather from one form of hierarchy to another20. In East Central Europe today, there is slightly any doubt as to who calls the shots or, who are the ‘missionaries’ wielding the ‘bible’ and who are the ‘local savages’, which listen with rapt attention to the universalistic canon21. This reading seems exaggerated at first sight. But if one thinks about it a little longer, the metaphor becomes persuasive. The Hegemonic Agenda of the West demands adaptation, not only to the requirements of the capitalist market and the customs of political democracy. But moreover to cultural norms, which although a relatively young child of societal change in the West, under the label of ‘Post-Modernity’ have gained the appearance of global relevance (Janos 2000: 366). If communism intended to create a ‘new socialist man’ then the ‘missionaries’ of the new Universalism preach a ‘new liberal man’, equipped with all the supranational opinions of the new era. Andrew Janos is designating this agenda as even more ambitious as Bolshevism (Janos 2000)22.
The instruments of Western Hegemony consist foremost in providing positive incentive structures, the perspective of accession to various euro-atlantic structures such as the European Union, the Council of Europe or NATO if specific conditions are fulfilled. Who is observing the rules of the club, may join it. The most important means of pressure are economic incentives. It takes the form of a traditional trade off: the offer of financial support23, shares of the market or direct investments are linked with the ‘favour’ of cooperative behaviour. The prospect of prosperity in an unified Europe is keeping the post-communist states disciplined (Janos 2000). Western pressure of adaptation can be divided in three phases:
In a first phase between 1989 and 1993 the promise of possible EU- and/or NATO-membership was rather uncertain in the questions ‘who’ and ‘when’. In this time the pressure on the East Central European States can be estimated very low (Borinski/ Wagner 2002). Not until persistent proclamations of annoyance of the East Central Europeans and propably the eruption of war in Bosnia-Hercegovina and therefore a change in the sensibility of the Western Europeans in security issues brought the turn in the enlargement question. In June 1993 the EU-summit in Copenhagen ended the self-reference of the euro-atlantic structures.
This EU-summit decided to grant the states of Eastern Europe a concrete perspective of accession. There the four countries of East Central Europe the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia were considered the most serious candidates24. Here the instument of conditionality was finally established. In this phase the European Union is beginning to exercise an ever increasing liberalization pressure with positive incentive structures on the East Central European States25. A similar development can be noticed in the case of NATO. The decision was taken in the beginning of 1994, when Washington made up its mind and opened the doors of the alliance to new members26. In September 1995 a study on NATO-Enlargement was published. This examination was in reality the equivalent to the Copenhagen Criteria of the EU. In almost identical form this study outlined the conditions of membership. Including the obligation to democracy, the protection of minorities, obedience to International Law, and the task of fulfilling the NATO-requirements.
The EU-summit in Luxembourg in December 1997 marked the beginning of the third phase and the actual negotiations for accession, which were opened with the so-called Luxembourg-Group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus) in March 1998. Parallely to the resolutions of the NATO-summit in Madrid and repeated distinct signals to Slovakia to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria (especially the political ones), Slovakia was expelled from East Central European pre-accession-groups. In this phase the Western community crossed the point of no return. Scope and intensity of Western engagement in East Central Europe were further deepened. This becomes visible clearly in the conscientious ‘Screening’ and ‘Monitoring’ of ‘Progress’27 by hegemonic agencies that encourage, praise, and hector their protégés as they dispense rewards and punishments on their now regular tours of inspection (Janos 2000: 367)28. The EU-summit of Helsinki in December 1999 decided the opening of negotiations with the second Group (Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta) in February 2000.
An intensification in asserting the Hegemonic Agenda revealed in the Kosovo-Crisis 1998/1999, when NATO reacted to the Serbian politics of ethnic cleansing with air raids, which were not authorized by the UN-Security Council. Shortly before the beginning of the attack the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO on the 12th of March 199929. In the opinion of Andrew Janos the USA emerged as a ‘genuine Ordnungsmacht in the 19th century mold’ (Janos 2001: 238). Linked to these new developments were formal doctrinary statements, which defined the parameters of the permissible. Since then we have the ‘Clinton-Doctrine’, which foresees military interventions to suppress violent eruptions of ethnic separatism and radicalism. As well as the ‘Verheugen-Doctrine’30 of February 2000, which is aiming against any populist and nationalistic parties in Eastern Europe. For instance the Slovak HZDS (Movement for Democratic Slovakia). A leading role of this party would certainly block membership in the European Union (RFE/RL 02/11/2000)31.
The synchronicity of EU- and NATO-politics is clearly documented in the more recent decision concerning enlargement. The summit in Copenhagen in December 2002 offered ten states (all candidate states with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania) the membership in the European Union in 2004. After the positive results of the referenda, the ten states (including the four East Central European States) will be member of the EU on the 1st of May 2004. In correspondence the NATO-summit in Prague had already decided in November 2002 to invite seven new candidates32 (including Slovakia) to become members in the near future33.
From the Inside out – Variables of Westernization
In this section the question is raised if the reactions or modes of adaptation of the post-communist foreign policies in East Central Europe to the pressures of liberalization were comparable, or if their policies varied to considerable degrees, which therefore points at the importance of specific cultural-historical, economic, and institutional contexts. This would underline the words of Joseph Schumpeter who characterized societies, their structures and cultural characteristics as follows: “like coins that do not readily melt. Once they are formed they (will) persist, possibly for centuries” (Schumpeter 1947: 12-13). Looking at the foreign policies of the four East Central European States after 1989, their general orientation on the euro-atlantic structures is striking. In detail the single paths of transition differ to a considerable degree. Especially noticeable in the case of Slovakia, which pursued between 1993 and 1998 an inconsistent, seesaw foreign policy34. Further examples might be the role of the Czech Republic and Poland as the main grumblers in the negotiations for EU-accession35. Or the loud protests against the air raids during the Kosovo-War 1999 in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, in contrast to the wide support in Hungary and Poland36.
The so-called liberalization approach thus reaches the borders of its explanatory potential. The realist argument should be supplemented by a constructivist interpretation to explain the foreign policy change in East Central Europe after 1989 sufficiently. More and more it is not theory competition, but their complementarity, which becomes the main aim of research in International Relations (Medick-Krakau 1999: 20). Constructivists are emphasizing the influence of specific national belief systems, patterns of perception and identities in the formation of state interests. These ideational factors create a context of action, which is constituting actors and actor constellations, influencing orientations of action, and defining decisive aspects of the respective situation, which the single actor is confronted with. In this reading, foreign policy decisions are less a result of political realities but rather their perception by the decision makers. Perceptions are shaped by belief systems and consist of normative, fundamental agreements, and specific social and situative experiences of the actors37.
From this perspective the clash between the Hegemonic Agenda of the West and national customs as well as interests had to be expected, since these are deeply engraved in the local economic and institutional structures, as well as in the culture and historical memories. Since these structural and cultural contexts diverge from society to society, the success in imposing the Hegemonic Agenda and finding obedience varies as well, thus the path of foreign policy transition (Janos 2001: 223). Remembering the three modes of adaptation (Ikenberry/ Kupchan 1990), we could possibly assign sample cases to each path of foreign policy change: a) Poland as example for normative persuasion, where the client state adopted new state policies which are compatible with those of the hegemon, here the belief system was already compatible with the cultural ideas of the West; b) Slovakia as case for external inducement, where the hegemon had to use especially economic incentives to induce the smaller state to change its policies, the belief system was in weak conflict with a Western orientation; and c) Serbia as a non-Central European example for internal reconstruction, where the hegemon directly intervened in the secondary state and transformed its domestic political institutions, during and after Kosovo-War 1999)38.
At the end I will try to answer the questions which were raised in the beginning: The scope of action for post-communist foreign policies in East Central Europe (after 1989) was and is very limited. The orientation of the foreign policies on the euro-atlantic structures (EU and NATO) and the performance in the frame of a Western model of foreign policy was against the background of a Hegemonic Change from Soviet Empire to Western Hegemony without any alternative. External influential factors have therefore in the case of foreign policy change in East Central Europe more explanatory potential. But the different paths of transition, the various speeds of the boats, which are all rowing in the same direction39, are the result of a complex interplay of cultural-historical contexts and economic, as well as institutional circumstances. If the Hegemonic Change and exogenic factors are determining the frame of the foreign policy transition, then the before mentioned endogenic interplay is conditioning the specific course of change. In my opinion it is especially the individual National Legacies which play a decisive role in this process.
SUMMARY
В статье немецкого политолога Джулиана Пэнке рассматривается проблема радикальных изменений международного порядка в Европе после драматических событий 1989-1991 гг., когда завершиалсь «холодная война», рухнул Советский Союз, разразился Балканский кризис, началась переориентация стран Восточной Европы на идеологию НАТО. Биполярный мир в Европе сменился монополярным – гегемонией стран Североантлантического блока. Однако эта последняя теденция породила новые проблемы.
Европа
