2015-08-21
427
Extending the Veto to New, Semi-permanent Members
The discussion about whether to extend the right of the veto to new members is in many ways parallel to the discussion about the categories of membership. And the arguments for and against are also quite similar. There is an additional twist to this issue, however: many of the countries or blocs that are vying for seats in an enlarged Council, particularly the African countries, say that they are in principle against the veto but that for the sake of democracy and equality it is paramount that new members have the same rights and privileges as the P5 currently holds. The issues of democracy and equality are common themes held by both those who wish to grant the veto to new potential members and those who do not.
Those opposing expansion of the veto say it will hamper the ability of the Council to address crisis situations in a timely fashion, or in some situations, at all. Added to that is possibly a certain level of wariness on the part of many Western countries with a taste for such concepts as the responsibility to protect, concepts which have received harsh criticism from many African countries. Some speculate that granting two African countries the veto may be a serious blow to implementing the doctrine of the responsibility to protect as well as weakening the International Criminal Court, which is in some circumstances depend on action by the Council, as provided by Article 13 of the Rome Statute.
Some speculate that a few of the most arduous proponents of expanding the veto are, in fact, trying to halt progress on reforms that they do not really support. The complex explanation for this is that an African country with no chance of winning either of the two permanent seats being requested for Africa, may see insisting on including the veto power as the best way to maintain a pan-African ethos of solidarity while simultaneously ensuring that none of the current front-runners will actually succeed in gaining permanency on the Council. This is the reason why some view the African group as being the most difficult stumbling block for the G4 in their quest to include additional permanent seats in any Council expansion.
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Abolishing the Veto for Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity
The S5 4 [7] has urged the P5 to agree to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of international humanitarian law. The benefits of such a limitation is fairly obvious. The downsides are less clear. The P5 countries point out that the rules of procedure of the Council are to be decided on by the Council as provided by and in accordance with Article 30 of the Charter. They argue that compromising on that principle could lead to a corrosion of the relationship between the GA and the Council. On a broader scale, there is a fear that allowing anyone to limit the privileges of the P5 could undermine the whole functioning of the Council. For those who want to see the veto modified or eliminated altogether, none of these concerns are sufficient to justify not limiting the veto, which in too many instances, they believe, has blocked the ability of the Council to take effective, timely action to safeguard peace and prevent the massive loss of life.
An additional complication, which arises when considering abolishing the veto under the aforementioned circumstances, is the issue of whether to include designating a crisis "genocide," "crime against humanity," or a "serious violation of international humanitarian law." This was made abundantly clear in the Council debate surrounding whether or not the atrocities carried out in Darfur in the last decade fell within the legal definition of genocide included in the Genocide Convention. Some speculated that the recently published Goldstone report further strengthened US opposition to giving up the right to use the veto in cases of certain specified crimes, given the disagreement about whether Israel's conduct in Gaza constituted war crimes or not 5 [7]. Both Russia and China have their own internal conflicts to deal with and have little appetite for discussing whether actions they have taken in dealing with these could be designated a crime for which the use of the power of the veto could no longer be invoked if the proposed reform were to be adopted.
Extending the Veto to Semi-Permanent Members Conditionally
It has been proposed to formally extend the veto to new, semi-permanent members, but requiring them to promise not to use it for the extension of the review period. This would, in principle, present the same opportunities and problems as discussed above, but add a new twist: how can it be implemented and administered legally? Would the Charter be extended before the review period to provide for the new, semi-permanent category of membership? Would the promise not to use the veto be inscribed into the Charter? Would everything be postponed until after the review process, alternatively would changes to the Charter be carved up in a legal step-by-step process? These questions may seem mundane but could prove very difficult to solve in real life and without a clear answer the model could be rendered useless.
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Completely Abolishing the Veto
A former Pakistani Ambassador to the UN, Ahmad Kamal, states that in a democracy no one can be more equal than others and he terms the veto anachronistic and undemocratic, a sentiment echoed by many African countries. Abolishing the veto altogether seems to appeal to quite a few member states, but many of these same states also maintain that if they themselves end up on the Council it would only be fair that they be endowed with the right of veto.
Among those who oppose abolishing the veto-and the P5 are the most prominent in that group-references are made to the League of Nations, which many believe ended up in demise because major powers such as the US refused to join. This, they argue, is exactly what would happen if the veto was abolished: the major powers of the world would either leave the UN or disregard or refuse to pay for UN actions they oppose. Whether the major powers would actually risk losing the legitimacy provided by the Charter is an open question, but the scenario presents the flip side of the cost-benefit analysis discussed above in the section on categories of membership. In reality the debate would seem to be moot as long as any P5 member refuses to agree to abolish or modify the veto: Article 108 of the Charter provides that two-thirds of the membership of the UN including all of the permanent members must ratify amendments to the Charter. Only then does the amendment come into force for all UN members.
While the veto could appear to be one of those irreconcilable issues that divide people as abortion, health care and tax questions do in local American politics, some diplomats close to the process say that it will not be a major determining factor when push comes to shove. As discussed recently [8] by the Center, there are rumors that the African group may be willing to soften their insistence on the Ezulwini consensus [9], which includes a demand for at least two permanent and two non-permanent seats in the Council for Africa, and supposedly this would include their stance regarding the veto.
As described in a recent article [10] by the Center, there is, at least theoretically, a large majority of member states in favor of revamping the working methods of the Council as well as its relationship with the GA. Two issues, however, seem to inhibit progress: those who can directly decide on the matters, the P5, are not eager to change things, and those who could put pressure on the P5, the remaining 187 member states, cannot thus far agree on whether and how to do so.
To date, the Center has found unanimous agreement among non-P5 member states that the Council should hold more open meetings. Even P5 representatives to whom the Center has spoken agree that more open meetings could increase transparency at the UN as a whole. And indeed, the number of open meetings has gone up over the last several years. There have reportedly also been more meetings between the President of the GA and the Council in recent years. Nonetheless, many also note that there is a limit to the number of open meetings the Council can have. Representatives from these countries maintain that certain discussions need to stay within the exclusive forum of the Council for it to maintain its efficacy.
Furthermore, as recently reported by the Center, some believe the increased number of open meetings has resulted in more decisions being reached outside the formal forum of the Council's chamber before they are brought to the full Council for a vote. Among other things, the informal meetings, oftentimes held by the P5-at times even by a smaller segment of the permanent members-are reportedly used to negotiate ways around usage of the veto. By settling contentious issues in an informal environment, the veto-wielding powers avoid having a veto cast when they vote on the action to be taken in the chamber. This process is seen by some as a positive way of reaching compromises and thus avoiding vetoes being cast, while others see it as an undemocratic rigging process that may block effective Council action while protecting the reputation of the veto threatening power or powers, but harming the image of the Council itself for its inability to contain a crisis situation. It is easy to imagine that extension of the veto to a handful of additional member states would make agreement in some crisis situations harder to reach, while at the same time lending greater weight to and support for those agreements that are reached. These contending views serve to underline the power associated with wielding the veto and why some member states believe that to achieve equitable representation the veto needs to be extended to more countries or eliminated altogether.
Asked about the advantages and disadvantages of reforming the working methods of the Council, experts were hard pressed to list aspects that would be disadvantageous to the world as a whole rather than merely to the P5. It is clear that the P5 is very concerned with any non-Council member trying to meddle with the procedures of the Council. The P5 has continuously made it clear, as did a P5 diplomat in an interview for this article, that the Council and the GA are two equal and independent bodies and must behave as such.
Geographical Representation
As described above, Article 23 of the Charter states that when choosing non-permanent members to sit on the Security Council "due regard" must be paid to the contribution of UN members to the maintenance of international peace and security, and also to equitable geographical distribution. Particularly the latter requirement is given as the main reason expansion is urgently needed now. Most member states agree that the current distribution of permanent seats in the Council severely under-represents some parts of the world, particularly Africa and Latin America, but also smaller states such as the Caribbean nations, and East European countries, which feel left out.
As expanded geographical representation would necessarily include numerical expansion, the advantages and disadvantages associated with broadening the geographical representation are the same as discussed above regarding a general expansion of the Council. Additionally, there is the question of whether a country can represent anyone other than itself that arises when considering whether to add regional or more individual seats.
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Regional Seats
When discussing Security Council reform, Africa speaks with one united voice, demanding two permanent seats for its continent; others are unsatisfied with the lack of permanent Latin American membership; and Central and Eastern European countries, as noted earlier, want a seat for their group. It is thus clear that there is some sense of unity within geographical groups representing more than just one country. A 2007 letter [11] from the appointed facilitators of Security Council reform, spelled out why some countries could be assumed to "represent, through internal arrangements, the views of the groups to which they belong." This, however, is a questionable assumption in many, if not all, cases. For example, can Brazil, the only non-Spanish speaking country on the Latin American continent, be said to represent Latin America, as one diplomat close to the process asks. Taking into account the fierce disagreement among African countries concerning which two countries should represent them on the Council, how could the two countries chosen be considered to be representative? The stern resistance from countries neighboring the powers that are vying to become permanent members of the Council, such as Pakistan, Korea, Italy, and Argentina, is a sign that neither the G4 nor any other member state can represent anyone aside from itself on the Council according to one expert who spoke to the Center. This expert added that regional representation only makes sense when countries in a region have agreed in advance to pool their sovereignty and share seats or make some similar arrangements, which will ensure that regional representatives will in fact represent a whole region and not just their own countries.
If this type of agreement could be reached in Africa, Latin America and Europe, however, expansion would suddenly be seen in a different light. One of the main obstacles Africa faces in its quest to obtain two regional seats-aside from its insistence on including the veto power-is its insistence that the two countries to be offered permanent membership must be elected by the African Union. The US, for one, has stated that this is unacceptable and has underlined that the two countries must be named before they will even negotiate the question of giving them permanent seats. This observation could undermine the idea of providing for rotating seats. While the US might be willing to accept seats for Latin-America rotating between, say, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico or for Europe between, say, Germany, UK, France, Spain and Italy, it would be politically difficult for them to argue in favor of rotating seats if the countries to rotate were to be elected by the Organization of American States or the European Union, respectively, rather than being restricted to a rotation amongst specifically pre-named member states in advance.
Conclusion
As we have seen, virtually every aspect of Security Council reform can be and has been argued in at least two ways: one that purports to show why it is an indispensable part of a just solution, and the other that claims it would only weaken the ability of the Security Council to carry out its duties without solving the problems of equitable representation. This article was written to shed some light on the different aspects involved in the ongoing debates that are taking place on Security Council Reform issues at the UN. It highlights and explains the areas of contention that member states have encountered to date that have stymied progress on implementing reforms that were agreed to in principle, but not fleshed out in detail, by the world's leaders and the General Assembly during the 2005 World Summit. Which proposals, if any, will be included as part of a final agreement-or even whether there will be sufficient compromise on the part of some key countries or groups to allow any agreement to be reached on Security Council reform-is impossible to predict at this point. As noted earlier, this may be the outcome that some powerful countries actually prefer. But whether such an outcome can fulfill the long-term interests of the world, or even of the UN itself, is a question that NGOs and diplomats alike might well ask themselves considering the need for change that the world's leaders identified in 2005.
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