Interests of leading powers in Libya and the region around

The European Union. First, the EU interested in security and stability in Mediterranean region. Moreover the Mediterranean Sea is the way for refugees and illegal migrants who try to come in Europe from African regions of Sahel and Sahara and the Libyan sea ports are the gates for the streams of these people. Any uncontrolled process in this territory means the growing of the threat. Also Libya is zone of strong tribalism and its boarders just are in maps.

Second, Libya is situated in the geographical center between Tunisia, Algeria, Niger, Chad, Sudan and Egypt. Stability in Libya means more guarantee of stability in the states and more capabilities for European powers to control of regional processes and risks.

France. It has additional national interests in Africa besides all European interests. French sphere of influence in Africa includes at least Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon and this sphere need on control both through the Gulf of Guinea in the South and Libya in the North. Therefore French president Nicolas Sarkozy acted as a mediator between Europe and Qaddafi since 2007.

Italy has own political goals in Libya which concluded in the essential role in the solving of EU challenges. That is to say Italy tries to reinforce its positions in Europe through engagement in some key issues such as Libyan issue in 2000s.

The United States has global interests and within the context of these Libya took place as a painful point in the non-proliferation regimes, counterterrorism and African and Middle East stability. After the normalization of relations with Libya in 2000s this state became a back-burner issue for the US. Any new tensions connected with Libya mean a growth of American attention to this region and robust political efforts there.

The Russian Federation has amorphous political interests in Libya. There is no clear agenda and initiative in Russian policy in the region and this policy relies on conservation of Qaddafi’s regime. Sure, Russia interested in counterterrorism, containment of radical Islam (Salafism) and Mediterranean stability but without objective capabilities for realization of these.

The People Republic of China pursues the aim of developing its presence in Africa and Libya does matter in the context of the status quo preservation and transparency of the “playing field” in the continent.

As for other actors (including Middle Eastern and Northern African states) they conduct an opportunist policy in reference to Libya and decide as appropriate.

3. Political landscape of Jamahiriya before the revolt of 2011: Col. Qaddafi’s family, institutions, tribes and religion

The issue of political landscape of Jamahiriya is a tricky enough in consequence of combination of bureaucratic, tribal and personal factors.

1) Family: The Qaddafi’s regime evolved into quasi-monarchy and succession of the power progressively became the main issue for aged Colonel. He has four sons – Saif al-Islam, Khamis, Al-Saadi and Mutassim. The oldest, Saif al-Islam, pretends to be a successor.

Each of them keeps own armed service or militia with well equipments and funding. The last such militia was established by Mutassim in 2008. These armed units serve as instruments in interim political competition within Libyan elite groups. So, we can see the escalation of political struggle in Qaddafi’s family and in Libya since at least 2008.

Another problem is that each son of Col. Qaddafi was a mediator between Libyan dictator and some groups of political, economic and tribal elites. In the case any handover of power in Libya means a breakdown of formed political relations and disruption of the system.

2) Institutions: Libyan government authorities characterized as “a byzantine bureaucracy obscured an informal network of constantly shifting power brokers… working with these figures was uncertain at best”[1].

At the same time it’s very important to see at armed forces of Libya because they hold indistinctive statement in Libyan political hierarchy despite of their role in revolution of 1969. Up to 2011 armed forces were marginalized, demoralized and not sufficiently financing and equipping. This trend began in early 1990s after the war with Chad because of Qaddafi’s fear of military coup.

So, Libyan governmental institutions were just an image of strength but the giant with feet of clay in reality.

3) Tribes: Tribalism is the core and the root of Libyan political system. There are number of tribes in Libya (see Map 2).

Main Arab tribes:

· Warfalla – a tribal group in west Libya, inhabiting the areas of Bani Walid, Sirte, Sabha and Benghazi;

· Magariha – a large tribe in the central-western region of Libya;

· Qaddadfa – arabised Berber tribe, centered around Sirte. Muammar Qaddafi belonged to the tribe;

Many lower-ranking officers of Libyan army belonged to Warfalla and Magariha tribes. There have been growing contradictions between these tribes and Qaddadfa since 1990^th although all the tribes had been political allies in previous times.

Other Arab tribes in Western Libya:

· Az-Zintan; Awlad Busayf; Maslata; Masrata with a large presence in Tripoli; Rijban, Rujban; Majabra, Mujabra (also and in the Jalo area in Cyrenaica in the Eastern Libya).

Arab tribes in Central Libya:

· Riyyah; Haraba; Zuwaid.

Arab tribes in Eastern & Southern Libya:

· Az-Zuwayya, Zuwayya, Zawiya (Benghazi, Ejdabiyah); Banu Saleem; Al-Obeidi; Manfa; Mesratha, Misurat (an Eastern Libyan tribe inhabiting a number of towns and villages including Benghazi and Darna); Al-Awagir, Waqir (the Barqa region of Cyrenaica); Tawajeer; Ramla; Kargala; Kawar; Al-Abaydat, Abdiyat (a group of 15 tribes found in the area of Tobruk); Farjan; Drasa; Masamir; Barasa; Fawakhir.

Berbers: Also there are many tribal groups of Berbers including Tuaregs (the Southern Berbers) which divided into various tribal confederations.

Toubou: Another group of non-Arab tribes is Toubou in Southern Libya near Egyptian border.

Any of presented tribes is political actor in Libyan landscape but with different capabilities because of the most powerful tribes situated in the cost and in the regions of oil recovery. Libyan governance is strongly depends on intertribal compromises, alliances and agreements.

4) Religion: Tribal clout, however, is tempered by other affiliations: a strong middle class and, increasingly, religion. Among Libya's Islamists, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, has long attracted the attention of the West because of its association with al-Qaeda. But non-Salafi networks preserve their matter – namely, the Sufi orders and the Muslim Brotherhood. The revivalist Sanussiya Sufi order has featured prominently in the country's collective memory. It provided the organizational base for the Libyan resistance to the Italian occupation and was the pillar of support for the monarchy under King Idris, who held sovereign power from 1951 until 1969.

Although long hostile to Sufism as a potential threat to his authority, Qaddafi himself had begun a policy of bolstering Sufi charitable networks as a buffer against radical Salafism. The long-suppressed Muslim Brotherhood may also reemerge as a potent force. It is perhaps significant that this organization was among the first Libyan groups to offer congratulations to the new regime in Egypt.

In conclusion of this chapter Jamahiriya has been unviable up to now, so it is crashing. The frames of a new political order are in complicated imbroglio of tribal, religious and secular aspects and actors.